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Chapter 1
Introduction
The financial crisis that started in 2007 was characterized by massive illiq-
uidity, fire sales and contagion, and has now been described as one of the
worst economic events in history since the Great Depression. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report [2008] estimated
that approximately $300 billion in subprime related losses set the stage for
a total market breakdown. During this market meltdown, we witnessed the
amount of net repo financing provided to U.S. banks and broker-dealers falling
by about $1.3 trillion [Gorton and Metrick, 2012], and the U.S. stock markets
loosing an estimated $8 trillion in wealth [Brunnermeier, 2009] before finally
recovering in 2013. The Federal Reserve reacted promptly to the emerging
crisis, but was quickly faced with the zero lower bound in its target policy
rate. As a consequence, the Federal Reserve was forced to resort to a number
of more unconventional monetary policies in order to control the crisis and
provide stimulus for the economy.
In this paper, we will provide further empirical evidence for the ongoing assess-
ment of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policies, with a special
focus on the U.S. equity markets. We contribute to the existing literature of
central bank balance sheet policies by analyzing the effectiveness of unconven-
tional monetary policy from a market liquidity perspective. More specifically,
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Figure 1.1: U.S. equity markets
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we compare Federal monetary programs to a market liquidity measure con-
structed from daily trading data from the NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ
stock exchanges.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the background of the
financial crisis, namely the trends leading to the crisis and systemic bank runs.
Section III accounts for the concept of liquidity in economic literature, and
provides a summary of the models of financial contagion relating to liquidity.
Section IV explains central bank balance sheet policies during the crisis. Sec-
tion V describes the data and empirical model used in the regression. Section
VI presents empirical results of the impact of unconventional monetary policies
on market liquidity. Section VII concludes.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Trends leading to the crisis
The causes of the recent crisis have largely been attributed to low interest rates
and a few specific trends in the banking industry, namely securitization, repo
finance and the shortening of the maturity structure of debt [see for example
Brunnermeier, 2009, Diamond and Rajan, 2009, Gorton and Metrick, 2012].
In the preceding years, the banking sector had moved out of traditional banking
to more complex securitized and leveraged financial activity. The new trend
was to securitize assets. That is, to combine or transform a collection of assets
such as loans or leases into a more easily tradable security. Essentially this
now meant that issuing banks no longer simply held loans until maturity, but
instead, pooled, tranched, and resold assets as asset-backed-securities [Brun-
nermeier, 2009]. For example, the mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) that were
at the heart of the financial crisis were basically asset-backed securities that
were secured by a collection of mortgages. But what really set these new long-
term assets apart from their predecessors, was that these assets were usually
split according to their credit rating and resold in secondary markets with an
average maturity of just 90 days instead of years or decades.
3
Chapter 2. Background 4
Another distinctive feature of securitization was that more often than not,
these mortgage-backed-securities were issued by third-party financial institu-
tions such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which were not part of regulatory
oversight, but were still involved in activities that are traditionally considered
exclusive to the banking sector. Namely, maturity transformation, liquidity
transformation, leverage and credit risk transfer. The main problem with such
a setup was that despite the relatively large share in total banking of these
third-parties, the lack of regulation signified that such financial intermediaries
were not qualified for access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit
guarantees in case of financial difficulties — they essentially operated in the
“shadows”. This fact coined them the name “shadow banks”. [Noeth and
Sengupta, 2011]
Figure (2.1) presents the total assets of financial intermediaries in 20 juris-
dictions1 and the Euro Area. From the chart we can see that the shadow
banking system grew rapidly from an estimated $26 trillion in 2002, to nearly
$62 trillion in 20072.
Securitization proved extremely popular because it was supposed to provide
risk diversification across borrowers, products and geographic location, while
exploiting the economic benefits involved in scale and segmentation. Further-
more, it was meant to provide better investment opportunities with increased
transparency, all while reducing costs. [Noeth and Sengupta, 2011]
But when the U.S. housing prices did not evolve as expected, the whole chain
of securities and derivatives was infected with uncertainty and mistrust. As
housing prices took a plunge, some of the newly securitized collection of assets
proved essentially worthless. These unforeseen and sudden valuation issues
in the subprime mortgage-backed-securities markets quickly sent shock waves
across the whole finance industry, as financial intermediaries refused to trade
with each other and instead started to hoard cash [Gorton, 2009].
1 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States, and South Africa.
2 See “Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation” [2011].
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Figure 2.1: Total assets of financial intermediaries
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2.2 Systemic bank runs
The panic that followed has been described as a series of bank runs on the
financial system itself [Mishkin, 2011]. This setup is somewhat different from
a classical Diamond-Dybvig [1983] bank run model, where depositors hurry to
withdraw their funds due to concerns on the solvency of the financial institu-
tion.
The classical Diamond-Dyvig model starts from a simple setup where banks
transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. Banks attract deposit contracts
from investors because these liabilities have a smoother return over time than
is offered by illiquid assets. These contracts have multiple equilibria because
individual investors face privately observed risks. As long as confidence is
maintained, risk sharing is efficient. But if risk sharing incentives are distorted
among agents and there is a sudden demand for liquidity, then this setup has an
undesirable equilibrium of a bank run, where all depositors panic at the same
time and try to withdraw all their savings immediately. This includes even
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those depositors who were not initially concerned about the solvency of the
financial institution. The strong outflow of funds that follows such behavior
can force a financially healthy bank to default as its reserves3 are unable to
cover the demand for withdrawals and it is forced to start liquidating assets.
If this panic is not contained, it can spread to other banks as well and create
a disruption in the monetary system and a reduction in production.
Instead of a classical bank run with depositors scrambling for their funds, in
2007 we witnessed a bank run on the sale and repurchase market by financial
institutions themselves [Gorton and Metrick, 2012] with very systemic4 char-
acteristics. To better illustrate this, normally when a bank took a $5 million
loan in a repo agreement, it might have had to submit $5.25 million of asset-
backed securities as collateral (suggesting a 5 percent haircut). But during the
bank runs, haircuts on some of these repo agreements could be nearing 100
percent, effectively rendering certain securities worthless as collateral [Noeth
and Sengupta, 2011]. More formally, Krishnamurthy [2010] describes this type
of generic balance sheet constraint for time t as
mtθt ≤ wt (2.1)
where m is interpreted as margin requirement, θ is the units of assets, and w is
the value of equity capital. Equity capital must essentially be equal or larger
than the required total margin. If margin requirements are suddenly increased,
the loan holder might be forced to oﬄoad some of the assets, which may put
downward pressure on w and cause the constraint to tighten even further.
Correspondingly, if various financial instruments are being utilized to increase
the potential return of an investment (but also to increase the potential losses!),
3 This is due to the fractional reserve system practiced in most countries. In fractional
reserve banking systems, a bank holds reserves that are required to secure withdrawals
for only a certain fraction of bank deposits. This type of banking enables the freeing
up of capital for more productive uses.
4 Systemic refers here to a shared vulnerability in the financial system. Nonsystemic
shocks lead to individual defaults, but a systemic shock may set off a domino effect of
defaults triggering more defaults.
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we can formalize a leveraged budget constraint following Kiyotaki and Moore
[1997] as
θtPt ≤ γθtPt + wt (2.2)
or, rewriting
(1− γ)θtPt ≤ wt (2.3)
where γ is the haircut on collateral, P is the asset price. Here θ units of assets
are pledged as collateral for borrowing γθP worth of assets (γ < 1). This
equation illustrates pretty well how borrowers are constrained by how easily
their assets can be pledged as security for financial purposes. An initial shock
to assets prices can lower the value of collateral assets, leading to a capital loss
that may be greater than the value of collateral due to leverage. But sudden
increases in haircuts can have comparable effects in the equation. In both
cases, the firm’s equity capital must be high enough to cover total margins or
it risks defaulting.
During the crisis we witnessed how this dynamic relationship persisted, strength-
ened and finally spilled over to other sectors. Soaring haircuts made it difficult
for banks to support the same amount of borrowing, so they had to deleverage
and sell some of their assets. But this deleveraging and asset sales pushed
market prices even lower, which put further pressure on securitized assets.
It is this type of deleveraging, which served as the amplification mechanism
that transformed what was first assessed to be a very limited disruption in a
very specific segment of the economy into financial crisis of global proportions
[Mishkin, 2011].
Basically, asset sales became mutually reinforcing. Each round of sales eroded
capital and tightened both lending standards and margins, creating a liquidity
spiral which caused even more fund withdrawals and collateral calls. This
dried up the lending channel and caused financial institutions to hoard funds,
which eventually burst as bank runs on financial institutions with adverse
Chapter 2. Background 8
network effects [Brunnermeier, 2009]. It has been argued, that the magnitude
of declining asset values and increasing haircuts meant that the U.S. banking
system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression
[Gorton and Metrick, 2012].
Chapter 3
Liquidity
3.1 Liquidity in economic theory
In order to better understand the financial turmoil that started with BNP
Paribas halting withdrawals from three of its investment funds in August 2007,
we need to introduce the concept of liquidity into our discussion. That said,
although the concept of liquidity is frequently used in academic literature,
there is no exact consensus available on what it actually means. The classical
theory of finance does not even take it into account — prices simply adjust in
frictionless macroeconomics-based tradition until equilibrium [Amihud et al.,
2005, Cochrane, 2004]. But empirical results suggest that simple lifecycle mod-
ifications or rebalancing motives are not enough to fully explain the observed
volume. Essentially, the empirical literature seems to be in agreement that the
variations in different measures of liquidity are correlated across assets [see for
example Chordia et al., 2000, 2001, Lo and Wang, 2000, Hasbrouck and Seppi,
2001, Huberman and Halka, 2001]. This effectively suggests that volume, liq-
uidity, and market microstructure effects can spill over and have an impact on
the level of prices witnessed in the market [Cochrane, 2004].
To start our decomposition of liquidity, we should first note that different asset
classes are faced with very different levels of fundamental liquidity. For exam-
ple, when compared to cash or U.S. short-term obligations, wealth invested in
9
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say, human capital, real estate, tax-deferred retirement accounts and savings
bonds tend to be very illiquid and might require weeks or even months to ar-
range a sale. Furthermore, these sales can also be quite costly to organize and
might even need official approval.
Liquidity (or the lack of it) in this sense can be used to refer to many market
imperfections such as the time required for a transaction to occur, or the costs
and regulations involved in organizing such a transaction, and hence cannot
be easily apprehended using a single statistic. More specifically, the observed
imperfections can be related to exogenous transaction costs such as brokerage
fees, participation fees, transaction taxes and processing fees that are related
to trading. But equally well, these imperfections can also refer to information
asymmetries that are attributed to the fact that some investors may have pri-
vate information about the fundamentals of a security. These asymmetries can
also be related to large trades and the order flow impact that they may have
on other market participants and/or market conditions. Equivalently, these
imperfections may also refer to the problem of finding a suitable trading part-
ner in time for a trade, and the reputation risk that relates to the potential
impact of what an institution’s or agent’s reputation might have on search
frictions in general. More often though, it can simply be a question about
demand pressures that may arise if not all agents are present for trades to
happen. Finally, the imperfections can also be attributed to the more complex
balance sheet mechanism and regulatory requirements that may also impact
risk management policies. These imperfections relate to financial constructions
that involve an institution’s or agent’s ability to insulate themselves from ex-
ogenous shocks, to financial configurations that affect the maturity structure
of their debt, and to other arrangements that may impose constraints and/or
limitations to funding and normal market operations. [see for example Amihud
et al., 2005, Tirole, 2011, Vayanos and Wang, 2012]
All said, the majority of economic literature usually settles in a much less de-
tailed approach. One particularly popular distinction is by Brunnermeier and
Pedersen [2009]. Brunnermeier and Pedersen emphasize the simple distinction
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between funding liquidity and market liquidity. The distinction is not as clear-
cut as one might want, but it helps to make a clear differentiation between the
balance sheet aspects and market effects behind liquidity.
Funding liquidity is used to refer to the general availability of credit and/or the
level of effort needed to secure additional borrowing or leverage. It is normally
evaluated based on a broad range of indicators that tend to measure growth
in monetary aggregates or a mismatch between liabilities and assets.
Market liquidity on the other hand, is used to describe the level of ease that is
required for financial transactions to take place. That is, the ability of markets
to absorb large trades without significantly affecting market prices. Generally
it relies in the assessment of measures such as the bid-ask spread, turnover
volume, volatility, and expectations of future volatility.
3.2 Problems measuring liquidity
Even with the simplification of funding liquidity and market liquidity, the
accurate measurement of liquidity can be a difficult exercise. One reason for
this is that, although funding and market liquidity are clearly distinct concepts,
they tend to be mutually reinforcing. Plentiful funding liquidity implies that
traders are not constrained by financial resources to make markets liquid, and
equally well, highly liquid markets make financing easier to acquire for trading.
Conversely, the opposite is true when funding or market conditions are scarce
[Tirole, 2011].
However, distinguishing when a sudden surge in one liquidity measure is just a
transitory matter or a more fundamental shock to the system is by no means
simple. For example, large and rapid price changes in volatility and volume
are not that uncommon in the financial markets. Public announcements of
macroeconomic data can set in motion substantial price changes in traded
securities. U.S. non-farm payroll (NFP) or consumer price index (CPI) data
releases can often be followed by large, discrete price changes at the time of
announcement. But this type of price activity is quite normal for smoothly
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functioning markets. It is considered to be a natural economic phenomenon
of price correction, as financial intermediaries try to adjust to and incorporate
all the newly available information into the observed price of the security.
Under normal circumstances, such price shocks pose no threat to the stabil-
ity of the general financial system. For example, studies by Ederington and
Lee [1993] and Fleming and Remolona [1999] show that price responses to
macroeconomic announcements in interest rates markets and foreign exchange
markets are completed within minutes of the data release. However in certain
market conditions, such as during periods of severe financial distress, these
rapid price movements can start gathering momentum from the endogenous
responses of market participants.
Finally, a more empirical issue relates to the fact that liquidity can potentially
involve massive amounts of data, making empirical research somewhat prob-
lematic. For example, market liquidity can measured in a myriad of different
ways. At its finest level, a suitable liquidity measure should probably encom-
pass detailed transaction data on both the quoted and effective bid-ask spread,
order depth, trade volume and market impact in terms of volatility and future
volatility [Vayanos and Wang, 2012].
However, transaction data does not always give true picture of market activity,
as it is often a feed redistributed from a single aggregated exchange, such as
BATS, and does not necessarily take into account price information that might
be available through other exchanges or proprietary professional feeds that
are designed for high-frequency algorithmic trading (HFT)1. But even these
professional feeds can have difficulties reflecting accurately all the liquidity
that is hidden beyond open markets in for example specialized dark pools2.
Although the true impact on liquidity of these “invisible” trades is still under
research, we are still able to make some conjectures. For example, Preece
1 For a more detailed description of HFT in U.S. equity markets, see for example Lewis
[2014].
2 Dark pools (or dark liquidity) refer to institutional trades that are not traded through
public exchanges. For a summary, see the “The pros and cons of dark pools of liquidity”
[2013].
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estimates in the Financial Times [2013] that a third of trade volume is non-
displayed, of which dark pools account for 13 percent. Such estimates suggest
that dark trading might not be that insignificant as far as market impact is
concerned.
In all, liquidity seems to be quite complicated to be measured accurately be-
cause the ideal data set would require massive amounts of microstructure data
that is not always available to the general public. Or even when available,
that information can be quite costly and limited in coverage making it not
that interesting to economists involved in academic research, where theories
are preferably tested on data spanning over decades rather than mere days or
weeks.
3.2.1 Liquidity proxies
From a theoretical point of view, more complex research methodologies do not
necessarily equate to better results. This is why most researchers usually rely
on some simplifications when estimating market liquidity. One popular alter-
native in the literature of financial economics is to utilize a proxy to estimate
liquidity. These liquidity proxies circumvent the inconveniences related to ob-
taining a complete microstructure data set by focusing on only a few publicly
available numbers in transaction records.
Some of the most important proxies in the literature are the illiquidity measure
by Amihud [2002], the measure for market liquidity by Pastor and Stambaugh
[2003], and the price impact liquidity measure by Sadka [2006].
The Amihud illiquidity measure is probably the simplest alternative of the
three proxies, as it proposes a very straightforward method for estimating
market liquidity. This substitute liquidity measure enables constructing the
time series necessary for econometric testing from readily available end-of-day
data. The ILLIQ measure, or daily ratio of absolute stock returns R to the
dollar volume V OLD, can be interpreted as the daily price response to one
dollar of trading volume. This gives us a rough measure of the price impact
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of liquidity in the markets. Formally, for each stock i on day d the illiquidity
measure is
ILLIQi,d = |Ri,d|/V OLDi,d (3.1)
Here the intuition is that lower liquidity stocks show a higher price impact per
trade of a given amount. The measure can be averaged over a month to get
the monthly illiquidity measure, or averaged over a sample of shares in order
to get a liquidity estimate for the aggregate market as suggested by Fontaine,
Garcia and Gungor [2015].
Pastor and Stambaugh take a slightly different approach by estimating the
price fluctuation induced by order flow (also known as the reversal effect).
The idea is that the volume of trade signed by excess market returns in a
share i causes price pressure on day d. But this order flow is going to partly
revert the next day depending on how much of the price impact was motivated
by liquidity (essentially this means that the liquidity measure is expected to
be negative for most stocks during normal conditions). Formally, the liquidity
measure for stock i in month t is defined as the ordinary least square estimate
of γi,t in the regression
rei,d+1,t = θi,t + φi,tri,d,t + γi,tsign(r
e
i,d,t)ϑi,d,t + i,d+1,t, d = 1, ..., D (3.2)
where ri,d+1,t is the return on stock i on day d in month t; r
e
i,d,t = ri,d,trm,d,t,
where rm,d,t is the return on the value-weighed market return on day d in month
t; and then ϑi,d,t is the dollar volume for stock i on day d in month t.
Although a single stock’s OLS coefficient γˆi,t is an imprecise estimate of γi,t.
The market wide average is estimated more precisely as the disturbances in
equation (3.2) are less than perfectly correlated across stocks. As the number
of stocks N grows large, the true aggregate market liquidity risk γi,t = 1/Nγi,t
for month t with N number of stocks becomes more precisely estimated by the
market gamma
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γˆt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
γˆi,t (3.3)
In Pastor and Stambaugh’s model, lower market liquidity suggests greater
aggregate price fluctuations induced by order flow. In other words, we should
expect γ to exhibit negative values of larger absolute magnitudes when liquidity
is constrained in the markets.
Sadka takes a relatively similar path by arguing, that liquidity risk is measured
through a regression of asset returns on the liquidity factor3. Firm-level liquid-
ity is decomposed into variable and fixed price effects, and it is the unexpected
variations of the variable component that create systemic shocks. Formally, at
time t we observe
∆pt = ψεψ,t + λελ,t + ψ¯∆Dt + λ¯∆DVt + yt (3.4)
where pt is the observed transaction price, the fixed components of price im-
pact are ψ and ψ¯ (permanent and transitory, respectively), and the variable
components are λ and λ¯ (again, permanent and transitory, respectively), V is
the order flow, D is a binary indicator variable which receives a value of +1
for a buyer-initiated trade and −1 for a seller-initiated trade, and yt is the
unobservable pricing error.
The limitations posed by the scope of our paper and our access restrictions
to accurate trade and quote (TAQ) data essentially rule out Sadka’s price
impact model from our study, so we are left with Amihud’s liquidity measure
and Pastor and Stambaugh’s market gamma. Both of these two liquidity
measures have been well received in the academic literature. Lou and Shu
[2014] estimate, that between 2009 and 2013, over a hundred publications in in
the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, and the Review
of Financial Studies use the Amihud measure for their empirical analyses.
3 Sadka’s approach is an extension of a methodology devised by Glosten and Harris
[1988], where price impacts are distinguished between fixed costs per trade, which are
independent of the order flow, and variable costs, which depend on the order flow.
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Equally well, Pastor and Stambaugh’s study has over 500 citations in the
RePEc database. The popularity of these measures can probably be attributed
to the relative simplicity of their construction, but also due to their reliance
on less sophisticated end-of-day data configurations that are readily available
from a number of sources such as Thompson Reuters or the Wharton Research
Data Services’ Center for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP).
Furthermore, Amihud’s proxy has a well-documented strong positive relation-
ship with price impact and expected stock returns. The empirical results have
been published in Amihud [2002], Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam [2009],
and Lou and Shu [2014], and while some other proxies tend to produce better
results [see for example Goyenko et al., 2009, Fong et al., 2014], none can really
match the minimalism of the Amihud proxy.
Yet, while the empirical work lend their support to Amihud’s liquidity proxy,
it is not without its shortcomings. Amihud’s research has been criticized of its
failure of mapping the relationship of the ratio of absolute returns to volume
into microstructure theory [Chordia et al., 2009]. Also, Amihud’s measure does
not capture well more volatile market conditions. That is, a situation, where
market activities include both up and down movements on a single trading
day. Positive and negative movements can offset each other, and therefore will
not be captured by the daily return variable. Lou and Shu [2014] estimate that
over 95 percent of the traded stocks on the NYSE have such characteristics,
and thus the numerator of the Amihud measure is estimated to capture on
average only 16.50 percent of the total intra-day movement.
On the other hand, although it is an observable fact, Pastor and Stambaugh’s
solution does not really explain beyond intuition why should there be a reversal
of trade flows in the first place. In this sense, one could say that Pastor
and Stambaugh’s market gamma suffers from the same theoretical problems
that plague Amihud’s liquidity proxy – namely, that it is mostly an empirical
observation without a sound foundation in economic theory.
What clearly does appear to set Pastor and Stambaugh’s solution apart from
Amihud’s liquidity proxy is however the proxy’s noise. That is, Amihud’s
measure seems to be a very noisy indicator with highly volatile estimates.
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Reducing the sampling frequency could rectify this, but this is not an ideal so-
lution. Another possible way of handling this issue as suggested by Ait-Sahalia
and Yu [2009] is in decomposing the total observed variance into a component
attributable to the fundamental price signal and one attributable to the mar-
ket microstructure noise. However, we consider that particular solution being
out of the scope of this paper, so we feel confident that the Pastor and Stam-
baugh liquidity factor is the best suited for our study. Henceforward unless
otherwise noted, the terms liquidity factor, liquidity measure, liquidity proxy
and market gamma in this study are used to refer to Pastor and Stambaugh’s
liquidity component.
3.3 Liquidity spirals and contagion
The BIS Committee on the Global Financial System [2010] argues that one of
the more dramatic features of the recent crisis was the magnitude of deleverag-
ing forced by margin calls in the markets, and how these sales had a profound
impact on credit access and risk-taking behavior of other leveraged market
participants. The abrupt tightening of secured lending conditions in 2008 led
to a substantial rise in the haircuts of funding terms and a rapid contraction
in secured financing. The erosion of funding conditions then triggered mas-
sive deleveraging in the markets, and forced many financial institutions to sell
assets at fire sale prices. Leaving many economists puzzled by the fact that
many AAA-rated securitized products were selling at significant discounts over
their fundamental value [Allen and Carletti, 2008].
The fire sale dynamic is well documented in the economic literature [see for
example Shleifer and Vishny, 2011], and basically it refers to a situation where
assets are sold at prices that do not reflect long-term financial fundamentals as
mentioned above in the case of AAA-rated securities. This type of situations
tends to occur when liquidity is scarce and market participants are forced to
trade at a dislocated price in order to make the trade happen. Essentially, it
seems that asset pricing under illiquid conditions can be very different from
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pricing in liquid markets, where traders are able to trade smoothly [Longstaff,
2004].
To illustrate such a scenario, Acharya and Pedersen [2005], and Garleanu and
Pedersen [2011] modify one of the better-known asset pricing models, the cap-
ital asset pricing model4 (CAPM), to include liquidity constraints. Acharya
and Pedersen propose a liquidity-adjusted CAPM model to account for mar-
ket liquidity risk, and Garleanu and Pedersen consider a CAPM model with
modifications for funding liquidity risk. Pedersen [2009] summarized this liq-
uidity dynamic in asset pricing well by augmenting the standard CAPM model
with both the market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. Formally, the
expected return for security i is
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where rf is the risk free rate, λ is the risk premium, β is the market risk, c
is the expected trading costs, ψ is the leveraged agents’ Lagrange multiplier
measuring tightness of funding constraints, x is the fraction of constrained
agents, and m is the margin requirement of the security. The first part of the
equation is the standard CAPM model. The second part describes the market
liquidity risk, namely that expected returns depend on the commonality in
liquidity, return sensitivity to aggregate liquidity, and liquidity sensitivity to
economic conditions. The third part describes the funding liquidity risk, that is
if a security has a higher margin requirement it is more difficult to finance, and
therefore its required return is higher when balance sheets are tight. The model
4 The capital asset pricing model is a model that is used in the pricing of securities. The
model describes the relationship between expected returns and risk. [see for example
Markowitz, 1952, Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965, Mossin, 1966]
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suggests that an increase in either market liquidity risk or funding liquidity risk
(or both) leads to an increase in the required rate of return.
3.3.1 The dynamics of liquidity spirals
While recent economic literature has put a lot of emphasis on the effects of
funding in liquidity shocks, Boudt, Paulus and Rosenthal [2013] underline the
highly endogenous nature of liquidity by reminding that the causal shock to
the financial markets may come from market liquidity as well. In this scenario,
financiers could raise funding charges in response to increased market volatility
and illiquidity in financial assets. This type of increased volatility is consistent
with Brunnermeier and Oehmke [2014], who argue that the instability could be
for example due to shocks from short-selling that creates systemic instability
through the endogenous response of market participants.
The relationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity has been mod-
eled in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]. Brunnermeier and Pedersen start
with the assumption that the market is populated by three groups of agents.
Customers and complementary customers want to trade, while dealers provide
immediacy and are thus market makers. All trades, both long (xj+t ) and short
(xj−t ) positions
5, must be financed with capital Wt. Here again, capital must
be large enough to cover the margin requirements of both long (mj+t ) and short
(mj−t ) positions. Formally,
∑
j
(xj+t m
j+
t + x
j−
t m
j−
t ) ≤ Wt (3.7)
The maximum a portfolio (x1t , ..., x
j
t) can lose over the next funding period is
then the margin requirement of the whole portfolio. Specifically,
5 A long position refers to buying a security with the expectation that it will appreciate
in value. Equally, a short position refers to selling a security with the assumption that
it will depreciate in value.
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The market illiquidity Λ of a security is defined as the difference between the
fundamental value (or final payoff v) and the current price, or Λt = |Et(v)pt|.
When a customer arrives in the market and needs to make a trade happen
due to an endowment shock z, they will supply −S(z, Et[v]pt] shares at any
time t = 1, 2. Complementary customers face an opposite endowment shock
and demand D(z, E2[v]p2) shares at t = 2. Equilibrium price at t = 2 is then
p2 = E2[v]. If p2 > E2[v], then there is excess supply, which the dealer is not
willing to absorb. Equally well, if p2 < E2[v], then there is excess demand
that the dealer is not willing to provide. Risk-neutral market makers provide
immediacy and face capital constraint
xm(σ,Λ) ≤ BΛ (3.9)
where σ is fundamental volatility and x0 is the initial endowment of shares. If
this constraint is binding in equilibrium, then the market is considered illiquid.
More specifically, the necessary and sufficient conditions are characterized by
the following properties
Proposition 3.1.
1. If S(z,Λ)m(σ,Λ) + x0Λ is decreasing in Λ, there exists a unique stable
equilibrium for each level of dealer wealth B. The equilibrium market
illiquidity Λ ∗ (B) is continuously decreasing in dealer wealth B.
2. Otherwise, there are multiple equilibria for some wealth levels. There ex-
ists equilibrium selections Λ ∗ (B) such that market illiquidity Λ ∗ (B) is
decreasing in dealer wealth B, but all equilibrium selections are discon-
tinuous: there must be B′ such that illiquidity jumps discontinuously if
wealth drops below B′ (fragility).
Proof. See Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009].
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The intuition here is that customers sell less if prices are not acceptable. That
is, S(z,Λ) is decreasing in Λ. In this model, problems of fragility can be
attributed to two scenarios. Fragility can either be a case of an increasing m
or a large initial endowment x0. An increasing m can destabilizes the system
due to dealer losses that lead to further spiraling reductions in market liquidity
and increases in margins (margin spiral). While losses stemming from an initial
endowment x0 can lead to equally spiraling decreases in liquidity and even
further losses on initial positions (loss spiral).
Proposition 3.2.
1. If Λ > 0 in a stable equilibrium, where −∂S
∂Λ
m− ∂m
∂Λ
S − x0 > 0, the local
sensitivity of illiquidity with respect to market maker wealth, fundamental
value, supply, and fundamental volatility are as follows
dΛ
dB
=
−1
−∂S
∂Λ
m− ∂m
∂Λ
S − x0
(3.10)
dΛ
dσ
=
∂m
∂σ
S
−∂S
∂Λ
m− ∂m
∂Λ
S − x0
(3.11)
Proof. See Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009].
A liquidity spiral (multiplier effects) arises if ∂m
∂Λ
S+x0 > 0, and the total effect
of this effect can amount to more than the sum of its parts due to mathematical
convexity arguments6.
Nonetheless, although Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s model is used here to de-
pict a market crash, it is worth noting that with minor modifications it can also
be used to model a liquidity bubble with prices reaching ever higher. Essen-
tially, a liquidity bubble could start from a positive funding liquidity shock. A
positive shock to liquidity could make funding easier to come by, leading to an
increase in demand for financial products. The increased demand could beget
an increase in prices, moving prices higher away from fundamentals. Higher
6 If strong enough, the multiplier effect from m or x0 can arise even if one spiral is working
in the opposite direction to mitigate shocks.
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prices could generate gains on existing positions, and could lead to looser risk
management and lower margins. This could lead to a further increase in the
supply of funding and even further surge in financial positions, resulting in a
similar amplification process as with liquidity spirals.
To conclude, this interconnectedness of funding and market liquidity can be
easily summarized in figure (3.1), which is based on the illustration that was
originally featured in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]. If we modify the orig-
inal illustration to include both the exogenous funding shocks and exogenous
market shocks, we can clearly see the full amplification mechanism behind
liquidity spirals. Here each wave of market and funding liquidity problems
reinforce each other, creating a systemic crisis.
Figure 3.1: Liquidity spirals
3.3.2 Liquidity spirals and financial crises
Fire sales can inflict severe losses to sellers and have the potential to create a
liquidity spiral where each wave of selling sets off another wave, making the
proper functioning of the markets impossible, and can even lead to a sharp
decline in other similar assets as well [see for example Morris and Shin, 2004,
Shleifer and Vishny, 2011]. Although the economic literature on the theoretical
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background of contagion is sizeable, the exact mechanics behind this economic
phenomenon are still not fully understood, and there is no consensus available
on how fire sales can initiate financial contagion in other assets. However, most
often the causes of liquidity crises are generally attributed either to financial
constraints, wealth effects, or information contagion.
Financial constraints, such as the balance sheet mechanism, are often cited
as an explanation for a number of liquidity crises in economic history [see
for example Gromb and Vayanos, 2002, Bernanke, 2009]. Basically this argu-
ment suggests that market wide declines in liquidity can be tracked to a shock
to funding. The initial shock can lower market liquidity, leading to higher
volatility that can further increase the risks of financing a trade. In essence,
plummeting asset prices can erode the capital of financial institutions, while
tightening lending standards and margins. The resulting fire sales can further
increase insecurity about the future in the markets, which can dry up the lend-
ing channels when banks start hoarding funds. Under such risk averse market
sentiment, the market cannot supply sufficient liquidity to the financial sys-
tem, because there is an incentive for savers to switch illiquid assets for liquid
assets7, which will leave the market as a whole short of liquid assets and long
illiquid assets [Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013]. If the amount of insecurity is high,
concerns about solvency can erupt in multiple bank runs on financial institu-
tions. Finally, complemented with the network effect of banks being lenders
and borrowers at the same time, can lead to a failure of counterparty risks
canceling each other out, resulting in severe systemic distress in the economy.
Kyle and Xiong [2001] on the other hand, suggest that the liquidity bottlenecks
are simply the result of wealth effects due to decreasing absolute risk aversion.
In this model financial intermediaries suffer losses which prompt them to liqui-
date positions. These liquidations increase volatility simultaneously in several
markets, leading to an increase in the correlation of price changes in seem-
ingly independent positions. This model relates well to more general models
of financial contagion, where the incentive structure of financial agents can
be seen to have a tendency to sell off holdings in several markets at the same
7 This effect is known as “flight to liquidity” [see for example Longstaff, 2004].
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time, creating additional disturbances that can spread across different financial
instruments and markets [Dornbusch et al., 2000].
Cespa and Foucault [2014] argue that the information value of price in different
assets is much more important than we realize, and that inter-market linkages
suggest that investors in one asset X can use the price of another security
Y as a source of information. A fluctuation in the price and liquidity of an
asset Y that is considered informative can have spillovers, and create a negative
feedback loop in asset X. Cespa and Foucault use this type of model to explain
the flash crash of May 2010, when thousands of securities fell by as much as 60
percent within minutes of trading. Cespa and Foucault’s research is interesting
in the sense that it can provide a theoretical framework to analyze liquidity
under the assumption that there exists a certain fixed cost to information, and
that these costs can lead to a herding behavior. This herding behavior can be
substantial in an environment where the number of potential assets grows and
the cost to analyze and follow all markets becomes increasingly high. Here,
according to Calvo and Mendoza [2000], if the information costs involved in
making a sound judgment are high enough, uninformed investors can simply
opt to mimic and copy the actions of more informed investors, which can result
in significant movements with equally powerful consequences on the markets.
With this model, it is easy to understand how a drop in a benchmark index,
or sales from a specialized hedge fund or well-regarded investor can potentially
stir panic in other investors operating in the same market.
The problem however with all these models is that they lack the clear dis-
tinction of when liquidity is under such stress that the rest of the economy
is in danger of contagion from fire sales. There simply is no clear measure
that would provide a reliable way of judging how vulnerable markets are, or
the scale of damage that might accompany such an event. Also, although we
might be able to observe empirically significant signs of co-movements between
economies, interest rates, assets and spreads, it does not necessarily serve as
evidence of financial contagion. Such correlation can just be attributed to the
historical transmission mechanisms, which also work under normal conditions,
and by such, do not serve as reliable statistical indication of contagion effects.
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To better illustrate the complexity involved in assessing the state of financial
markets, we can briefly examine the national financial conditions index (NFCI)
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago8. The national financial conditions
index is designed to provide a thorough account on U.S. financial conditions in
the financial sector, also including both the traditional and “shadow” banking
systems. Positive values in the NFCI indicate financial conditions that are
tighter than average, while negative values indicate financial conditions that
are looser than average. While all this sounds simple enough, a closer look
to the structure of three subindexes (risk, credit and leverage)9, reveals that
the NFCI calculations actually use a total of 105 different variables10 ranging
from stock price indexes to treasury yields and LIBOR spreads to come to a
conclusion about the state of the financial environment.
The NFCI is a perfect example on why the subject of financial stability is such
a challenging topic for approximation. Empirical research on systemic crises
and contagion is problematic because the definition itself is relatively broad.
Mere price observations do not constitute an appropriate estimate of financial
conditions. If we are not able to isolate the endogenous impact of business cycle
fluctuations and/or monetary policy influences from price observations, it is
not evident what we are or should be assessing. Yet, depending on whether we
are measuring network externalities or just evaluating potential risk associated
with accounting practices or regulation, we can arrive to very different policy
recommendations with very discrete welfare implications.
8 Other composite measures of financial conditions are published for example by
Bloomberg (Bloomberg United States financial conditions index), the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland (Cleveland financial stress index), the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City (Kansas City financial stress index), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(St. Louis Fed financial stress index), and the OECD (OECD economic outlook).
9 The NFCI risk subindex captures volatility and funding risk in the financial sector;
the NFCI credit subindex is composed of measures of credit conditions; and the NFCI
leverage subindex consists of debt and equity measures. For a more detailed look, see
Brave and Butters [2012].
10 Each expressed relative to their sample averages and scaled by their sample standard
deviations.
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Some observers11, including former Treasury secretary Larry Summers, have
actually expressed their concern that the new banking regulations that have
been passed to ensure the stability of the financial system during future market
downturns, can actually prove to be counterproductive in times of real stress,
and might inhibit the ability of financial institutions to stay afloat. The main
argument is that unlike investment funds, which are essentially only custodians
to clients’ investment capital, banks can actually default on trading losses that
can accumulate from positions that they might be forced to hold on in a fire
sale market environment.
The conundrum is that the very rules on capital, liquidity regulations and
limitations on trading such as the Basel III accord, that are supposed to prevent
the repeat of the events of the financial crisis could actually make the markets
only more illiquid. Brunnermeier, Crocket, Goodhart, Persaud and Shin [2009]
argue that it was due to the fact that the financial sector tends to be highly
regulated in terms of portfolio strategy and operations that the financial sector
got into trouble during the crisis.
Strict accounting and portfolio regulations are in place to protect the general
public, but these same regulations can become a burden if the market wit-
nesses extraordinary conditions that require swift actions. Plummeting asset
prices can force many institutions to rebalance their investment portfolio partly
because they may face regulatory constraints as to demonstrate solvency by
reducing exposure to volatile stock prices, but also because a correction in the
price of one asset can make another asset’s share of the investment portfolio too
large in terms of regulation. This dynamic relating to this type of regulatory
constraints can force many financial institutions to balance their portfolio and
thus contaminate even a healthy asset. Hence, strict regulation can become
pro-cyclical and essentially push stock prices even lower when plummeting
asset valuations make balance sheets weaker and increase leverage.
Essentially, a severe downturn combined with inflexible regulation can thus
result in a financially hostile environment with serious consequences. Which
11 See the April 18th edition of The Economist,“Frozen” [2015].
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is why it always should be asked, whether the risk posed by market failure is
greater than the risk posed by policy failures.
Chapter 4
Monetary policy
4.1 Monetary policy at the zero lower bound
Central banks usually have a decree for them to supervise and intervene in
markets, when there are distortions that can be considered systemic. The U.S.
Federal Reserve for example lists four distinct duties1. First, its mission is
to conduct the nation’s monetary policy in pursuit of maximum employment,
stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates. Secondly, supervise and
regulate banking institutions to ensure the safety of the nation’s banking and
financial system. Thirdly, maintaining the stability of the financial system and
containing systemic risk. Finally, its mission is to provide financial services to
depository institutions, the U.S. government and foreign official institutions.
In light of our narrative on liquidity and the financial markets, we can easily see
that from a central banks perspective, liquidity contagion poses a clear danger
to the stability of the financial system and presents strong systemic risk for
the whole economy. Liquidity shortages can lead to a contagion of failures
that include the risk of a total meltdown of the system if not controlled, which
given the economic costs associated with meltdowns, can be argued to present
a solid case for a strong set of intervention [Diamond and Rajan, 2005].
1 See the Federal Reserve System’s “Purposes and Functions” [2005].
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This is probably why the Federal Reserve has often taken a role in stabilizing
the economic and financial systems following various shocks to the economy.
Although, each scenario has been unique in terms of causes and features, they
all had the potential to disrupt economic activity and threaten price stability
[Neely, 2004]. For example, in 1987, the Federal Reserve provided liquidity af-
ter the stock market crashed in October. In 1998, the Federal Reserve lowered
short-term interest rates following the default of the Russian ruble. In Septem-
ber 2001, the Federal Reserve stepped in to provide liquidity after the terrorist
attacks in New York. During the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve
quickly responded by cutting its policy rate from 5.25 percent in September
2007 to between 0 and 0.25 percent in January 2009, effectively hitting the
zero lower bound for interest rates [see for example Mishkin, 2011, Chadha
et al., 2012].
Figure 4.1: Key interest rates
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Under normal circumstances, the policy responses of the Federal Reserve can
be divided into short-, medium and long-term responses [Neely, 2004]. In the
short-term, the uncertainty accompanying the crisis might necessitate immedi-
ate provisions of liquidity. While in the medium-term, the crisis might require
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the central bank to keep interest rates lower in order to safeguard business
conditions. The long-term effects are generally attributed to the efficient allo-
cation of resources. However, because nominal interest rates cannot go much
below zero, conventional monetary policy loses effectiveness when interest rates
approach zero. Monetary policy at the zero lower bound had previously been
largely a theoretical question, so the Federal Reserve found itself in a situation
where it had to experiment with a large number of unconventional measures
in order to contain the crisis [Mishkin, 2011]. The literature on the Federal
Reserve’s policies is abundant, so we will provide only a quick summary of the
tools involved in unconventional policies. For a more detailed report, see for
example Labonte [2014].
As the policy rate hit the zero-lower-bound, a number of unconventional mon-
etary policies were introduced. Namely, these policies focused on liquidity
provisions and asset purchases. The initial policy reactions were largely de-
signed to focus on providing ample liquidity to stabilize financial markets and
shore up confidence, while later policy responses placed a greater emphasis
on lowering borrowing costs and easing credit conditions, in order to promote
growth and employment [Chadha et al., 2012]. These nontraditional opera-
tions have usually been tagged under the heading of “quantitative easing” and
have been described as quasi-fiscal or even fiscal [see for example Chen et al.,
2011, Chadha et al., 2012] by nature, because they often have a direct impact
on the size and composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet.
Overall, the sheer magnitude of liquidity provisions and asset purchases is
impressive. The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet expanded sharply from $0.870
trillion in August 2007 to $2.239 trillion by the end of 2008. In November 2014
it was valued at $4.481 trillion.
Liquidity provisions have traditionally been executed by expanding lending
from the Federal Reserve to both banks and financial institutions. Loans made
through this measure have usually been made with a certain discount rate
above the federal funds rate target with the purpose of maintaining the smooth
working of financial markets. The Federal Reserve cut the discount rate two
times, and even expanded the types of securities eligible to be used as collateral,
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Figure 4.2: Total balance sheet assets of the Federal Reserve
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but its negative reputation as lending of last resort still persisted [Mishkin,
2011]. In order to circumvent these negative signals, the Federal Reserve set up
a temporary term auction facility (TAF), which enabled anonymous borrowing
at a rate determined by auction. The Federal Reserve expanded its liquidity
provisions with new lending programs reaching beyond banks, even engaging
in lending to prop up casualties such as Bearn Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. For example, when AIG collapsed after it had written over $400
billion worth of credit default swap (CDS) insurance contracts on subprime
mortgage securities, the Federal Reserve had to step in with a $85 billion loan
in order to keep AIG afloat [Mishkin, 2011]. The Federal Reserve also engaged
in liquidity swaps with other central banks.
Asset purchases are based on the notion that direct buying of certain classes of
bonds can increase their value, thereby lowering interest rates [Mishkin, 2011].
The first round of asset purchases began in November 2008. The Federal Re-
serve engaged in buying $1.25 trillion worth of mortgage-backed securities and
$200 billion in federal agency debt. Furthermore, to help put some downward
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pressure on interest rates in general, the Federal Reserve also implemented
a $300 billion program to purchase long-term Treasury bonds. The second
round of asset purchases began in November 2010 with a $600 billion program
to purchase long-term Treasury securities. The third round of asset purchases
started in September 2012 with the commitment from the Federal Reserve
to purchase $40 billion of mortgage-backed securities per month. Addition-
ally, the Federal Reserve began a $400 billion maturity expansion program in
September 2011, where longer term Treasury purchases were to be financed
by selling shorter term Treasuries in order to extend the average maturity of
the Federal Reserve’s Treasury portfolio to 100 months. This was meant to
put downward pressure on the interest rates for longer-term Treasury securi-
ties, thus contributing to easing in credit market conditions and supporting
economic recovery [Chen et al., 2011]. Finally, after tapering asset purchases
at each of its six previous meetings, in October 2014 the Federal open market
committee (FOMC) announced the end of its multi-year asset purchases.
4.1.1 Assessing the success of unconventional monetary
policy
First of all, it is important to note that an objective analysis of the impact or
efficiency of quantitative easing policy on asset markets in a very exceptional
environment of zero lower bound interest rates and global financial crisis is by
no means simple, and can pose special challenges. For example, assessing the
effects of policy announcements that are complicated, and are frequently ex-
plained only in subsequent press conferences is problematic. More often than
not, these statements take time to digest. The assessment of the policy an-
nouncements can last from anything from a few days to weeks, all the way up
to months or even years. Not only do such potential delays raise the question
of impact persistence and how to measure it in a volatile market environment.
The crisis period witnessed numerous market interventions by several parties
worldwide, so it can be problematic to assume that the response witnessed
in financial markets at a certain point in time is solely driven by the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy announcements and/or market operations. In other
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words, retracing the causal relationship to a single quantitative easing pro-
gram can be difficult to establish. Furthermore, often it is the case that these
announcements and/or market interventions come not as a total surprise, but
as a result of a forward guidance that had been stated weeks or even months
earlier. All these may affect the results of empirical research, and thus the
assessment of the success of unconventional monetary policies can prove to be
a challenging task.
The former chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke [2009] argued that
the unconventional monetary policies were supposed to provide stimulus for
the U.S. economy and revive the credit markets. But not all economists were
convinced of the effectiveness of unconventional measures. The evidence from
Japan in recent decades did not support being so positive on the idea that a
pure expansion of a central bank’s balance sheet would be particularly effec-
tive in stimulating aggregate demand [Kuttner, 2004]. Moreover, some skep-
tics pointed out that many government actions were ineffective and lacked
predictability, and may also have raised the perceived level of risk in finan-
cial markets thus prolonging and worsening the crisis [Taylor, 2009]. Mishkin
[2011] dismissed Taylor’s criticism on grounds of counterfactual - what would
have happened if the Federal Reserve had not reacted the way it did. In most
likelihood, interest rates would have been higher and credit spreads would
have been broader, all contributing to making the financial conditions even
more stressed than they were. Kuttner’s criticism was addressed by Bernanke
[2009] who suggested that balance sheet policies were not intended to stimu-
late aggregate demand per se, but rather should had been seen as an attempt
to lower spreads between different asset classes. This view fits well into Ped-
ersen’s [2009] augmented CAPM model, where haircuts through central bank
lending can alleviate liquidity frictions by decreasing the required rate of re-
turn as funding conditions are improved. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]
argue that this is essentially the mechanism by which central banks can im-
prove market liquidity. The theory suggests that if a central bank is able to
distinguish liquidity shocks and conveys this to financiers, the financiers may
ease their margin requirements. Alternatively, the central bank can improve
funding conditions during a crisis, either by providing emergency funding or
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simply announcing its intention to do so. If the central bank is credible, the
financiers may ease their margin requirements as worst-case scenarios are less
likely to materialize.
This is essentially the central tenet of what is generally known as Bagehot’s
principle. Bagehot’s dictum states that a key responsibility of central banks is
to provide the liquidity that is necessary in order to preserve the functioning
of the financial system and support economic activity [Madigan, 2009]. More
precisely, Bernanke [2009] has stressed that the Federal Reserve has a role
at improving overall market liquidity and market functioning with monetary
policy, but also a role in reducing funding pressures for depository institutions
and primary securities dealers. Equally, he has also stated that the multiple
instances of run-like behavior during the crisis, together with the associated
sharp increases in liquidity premiums and dysfunction in many markets, thus
motivated much of the Federal Reserve’s policy response [Bernanke, 2012].
The possible policy responses of a central bank can be illustrated using equa-
tions (1.1) and (1.3). Essentially, a regulator has a few different options at its
disposal when facing a liquidity induced crisis. A central bank can either try
to bring down m, the required margins on new funds, decrease the haircut θ,
or try and stabilize the asset prices. The cost of financing m and θ relates to
funding liquidity, while asset prices are primarily an issue relating to market
liquidity.
The economic literature assessing the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing
policy seems to be relatively positive on the impact to credit spreads and yield
rates that are usually the basis for margins m and haircuts θ. Starting on
a more theoretical approach, Doh [2010] argues that the central bank’s large-
scale asset purchases can alter the supply of bonds, and thus decrease the term
premia in long-term bond yields. This reduction should be bigger the higher is
the risk aversion of arbitrageurs. Equally well, Chadha, Corrado and Meaning
[2012] studied the impact of non-conventional policies with a micro-founded
macroeconomic model. They agree that the issuance of reserves improves the
liquidity of the banking sector. But note that the converse is also true. Also,
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their impulse response studies show that balance sheet policies can stabilize
the economy.
Empirical studies have focused on early stage market operations and large-scale
asset purchases, and there seems to be a clear consensus that these market
interventions succeeded in impacting market conditions. The term auction fa-
cility (TAF) has been deemed particularly effective. For example, McAndrews,
Sarkar, and Wang [2008], find that the term auction facility did significantly
lower the LIBOR-OIS credit spread2. The results notable in the sense that
they saw a reduction that was roughly equal to 90 percent of the average level
of the LIBOR-OIS spread during the credit crisis. On a similar note, Chris-
tensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch [2009] assess the effect of liquidity provisions
on term LIBOR spreads over Treasury yields using weekly observations. They
find that the term auction facility did lower LIBOR rates starting in December
2007 and through the end of their sample in July 2008. Wu [2008] also claims
that the term auction facility had a strong effect on the LIBOR-OIS spread,
but he is less convinced about the effectiveness of the term securities lending fa-
cility (TSLF) and the primary dealer credit facility (PDCF) introduced by the
Federal Reserve. Ait-Sahalia, Adnritzky, Jobst, Nowak, and Tamirisa [2012]
find that liquidity provisions did help lower interbank risk premiums. More
specifically, they study systemically important advanced economies (the Euro
area, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States), and find that the policy
announcements did manage to contribute to the reduction of the LIBOR-OIS
spread between June 2007 and March 2009. On a similar note, Sarkar and
Shrader [2010] study the impact of the term auction facility and swap facilities
to the LIBOR-OIS spread from August 2007 to July 2009. They conclude that
increases in the supply of funds in TAF and swap programs are associated
with a reduction in the LIBOR-OIS spread early in the crisis. They also de-
duce that a reduction in the funds of these programs had no significant impact
on interest rate spreads during the observed period.
2 The LIBOR-OIS spread is the difference between the London interbank offered rate
and overnight indexed swap rate. It is considered a key measure of credit risk within
the banking sector [see for example Thornton, 2009].
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Large-scale asset purchases have also been well-received in the economic liter-
ature. For example, D’Amico and King [2010] report a statistically significant
flow and stock effect of large-scale treasury purchases in 2009. More specifi-
cally, the immediate market response (flow effect) to the purchases could have
reduced yields by 3.5 basis points, but the more persistent stock effects of
the program could have shifted the yield curve down by as much as 50 basis
points. Large-scale asset purchase programs have also been deemed effective,
with Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack [2011], arguing that these programs
lowered long-term bond rates relative to short rates. More precisely, they argue
that large-scale asset purchases have lowered the term premium. This reduc-
tion appeared to be between 30 and 100 basis points for the ten-year term
premium. But the more powerful effects have been witnessed on longer-term
interest rates on agency debt and agency mortgage backed securities (MBS).
Christensen and Gillan [2013] study the Federal Reserve’s QE2 program. They
conclude that large-scale asset purchases of Treasury inflation protected secu-
rities (TIPS) dropped the liquidity premium on Treasuries by up to 50 percent
between November 2010 and June 2011.
On the other hand, the economic literature on the effects of unconventional
monetary policy on equities seems to be somewhat scarce. This is probably
because the concept of influencing share prices is not that clear cut. While it
has been argued that monetary policy is transmitted through the stock market
via the “wealth effect” of private portfolios [Bernanke and Kuttner, 2003], It
has been noted that the Federal Reserve does not target stock prices per se,
but is more interested in the disruptive effects that price corrections can have
on the real economy [see for example Neely, 2004, Bernanke and Gertler, 1999].
A few papers have studied the impact of quantitative easing on share prices,
and have found a positive relationship between balance sheet policies and eq-
uity market returns. For example, Bayoumi and Bui [2011] use event studies
to analyze the impact of the 2008/2009 and 2010 monetary stimulus packages
to asset prices across a selection of G20 countries and Switzerland. They con-
clude that U.S. QE1 announcements had a strong initial impact on financial
conditions, including commodity prices and U.S. and foreign equities. But
the effects of QE2 announcements were generally not statistically significant.
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Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub [2013] agree that early measures such as the
QE1 program were highly effective in lowering sovereign yields and raising
equity markets. They also add that these policies seem to have triggered a
portfolio rebalancing across countries out of emerging markets (EME) into US
equity and bond funds. Rogers, Scotti and Wright [2011] evaluate bond yields,
exchange rates and stock prices using intraday asset price data from the Euro
area, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States to conclude that uncon-
ventional monetary policy has proven effective in reducing the term premia,
thus easing financial conditions. They also note that the U.S. monetary policy
has some important cross-country spillovers to other economies.
But we feel that these approaches are perhaps a bit too one-dimensional, as
stabilizing the financial markets should not be seen as a simple assignment of
observing prices per se. We rather believe that it should be about assessing
the liquidity related components behind the pricing mechanism that can set
off systemic shockwaves. In this sense, although our interpretation is identical
in terms that we believe the Federal Reserve was trying to impact liquidity
and stabilize the markets, our analysis differs as to what we should be focusing
on. We believe that the more interesting aspect about observing asset prices
and unconventional monetary policies should relate to analyzing whether these
monetary programs have had an impact on the liquidity related component
in equities traded in financial markets. In other words, we should address
the topic of whether the unconventional monetary programs managed to have
a stabilizing impact on market liquidity in the financial markets during the
crisis.
Chapter 5
The empirical model
5.1 Overview
In order to gain a better understanding of the impact of the Federal Reserve’s
unconventional monetary policy, we evaluate the effects of quantitative easing
on market liquidity. More specifically, we propose to compare the changes in
the liquidity component of trade in major U.S. stock exchanges to the changes
in the unconventional monetary programs by the Federal Reserve. In this
section we will describe our data sources and provide more detailed information
in the variables used in our regressions.
5.2 Data description
In the empirical part of our study, we observe daily end-of-day trading data
ranging from the beginning of the financial crisis in February 2007 until the end
of the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programs in November 2014. The
daily closing prices, holding period returns, trade volume, number of outstand-
ing shares and value-weighted market return data used in the calculation of
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the Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity measure are from the Wharton Research
Data Services’ CRSP database1.
We calculate the dollar trade volume for each stock i based on the trade volume
and share price. We do this because the dollar volume is generally a better
statistic of liquidity than simply the number of shares traded because it gives an
indication of how easily large trades are absorbed by the markets. Similarly,
the market capitalization for each share i is calculated from the number of
shares outstanding and the share price.
The weekly balance sheet data of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional mon-
etary policy programs as well as control variable data on the S&P 500 index,
VIX index, and the TED spread are all courtesy of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis’ Federal Reserve Economic Data program (FRED)2.
5.2.1 The liquidity measure
In the spirit of Pastor and Stambaugh [2003] we measure market liquidity in
the equity markets through a proxy that uses stocks listed in the NYSE, NYSE
MKT and NASDAQ for computations3. In order to be included in our test
sample, the equities need to adhere to the following criteria.
First of all, we limit our study to ordinary common shares (share codes of 10,
11 or 12 in the CRSP database). This criterion excludes for example shares
of beneficial interest (SBI), real estate investment trusts (REIT), certificates,
units, closed-end funds and Americus trust components from our sample. We
adopt this fundamental guideline because most if not all non-common shares
can demonstrate highly volatile trading due to the strictly limited number of
shares available for trade in public. Including these shares in our liquidity
calculations could have the potential to seriously affect our results.
1 http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/
2 http://research.stlouisfed.org/
3 Note: AMEX was acquired by NYSE in January 2008.
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Table 5.1: Variables used in regressions
Variable Description
γˆt Pastor and Stambaugh market liquidity measure
QE1 Outstanding value of QE1, from November 2008 to
September 2010, in billions of dollars
QE2 Outstanding value of QE2, from November 2010 to
July 2012, in billions of dollars
QE3 Outstanding value of QE3, from September 2012 to
November 2014, in billions of dollars
LFI Outstanding value of lending to financial institutions,
in billions of dollars
LCM Outstanding value of liquidity to key credit markets,
in billions of dollars
sp S&P 500 index
vx VIX index, or the options-implied volatility in equity
markets
td TED spread, or the 3-month Treasury bill minus
3-month interbank loans
Secondly, we require the shares to be traded in the NYSE, NYSE MKT or
NASDAQ stock exchange. Some studies, Pastor and Stambaugh [2003] for ex-
ample, have excluded NASDAQ listed shares from liquidity calculations simply
because the available returns and volume data doesn’t cover the study period.
Other studies have omitted these from calculations because NASDAQ also in-
cludes interdealer trades in the supplied trade data, and these large trades
have the potential to affect liquidity calculations. Judging from a few sample
computations, our regressions don’t seem to display any distinguishable ab-
normalities depending on whether NASDAQ trades are included or not in the
sample, so we refrain from excluding them in our study.
As our final requirements, we expect the shares to have at least a certain num-
ber of trading observations per week and a market capitalization above a set
level. We apply this prerequisite for mostly the same reasons as with the re-
quirement for common shares. That is, we try to filter shares out that are
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highly illiquid4 and have the capacity to heavily influence our liquidity esti-
mates. However, we do understand that the market capitalization requirement
and the expected amount of trades per week are relatively arbitrary specifica-
tions and have no set standards available for the purpose of economic research.
This observation is almost painfully evident from a few of our test calculations,
where we can easily note that the chosen values can have a significant impact
on the liquidity measure. Nevertheless, we are equally concerned about impos-
ing too strict of a criterion to our sample data, so we try and proceed with the
minimum acceptable standards. For our needs, we suggest a minimum of at
least four trading observations per week and a market capitalization of more
than $10,000,000.
With the previously stated requirements in mind, we proceed calculating the
Pastor and Stambaugh market liquidity measure for NYSE, NYSE MKT and
NASDAQ stock markets for each week, starting from February 2007 and end-
ing in November 2014. We start by computing individual liquidity measures
for each stock that complies with our four requirements. The liquidity mea-
sure for each stock i is estimated using the regression rei,d+1,t = θi,t + φi,tri,d,t +
γi,tsign(r
e
i,d,t)ϑi,d,t + i,d+1,t as described in equation (3.2). After we finish run-
ning these individual liquidity measures, we construct a market wide liquidity
measure by aggregating the individual liquidity measures. The market liquid-
ity measure γˆt following equation (3.3) is then γˆt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 γˆi,t, which is the
arithmetic mean of the OLS coefficients of each individual stock.
Figure (5.1) describes the evolution of market liquidity from February 2007
to November 2014. Visual inspection of the weekly aggregate liquidity mea-
sure is in line with the unfolding of events of the recent financial crisis. The
market liquidity measure shows sharply increased volatility and a clear trend
lower starting in 2008, with some large liquidity shocks during the first waves
of the financial crisis. Big spikes occur in early 2008, probably due to the
failure of Bear Stearns. These spikes are quickly followed by a massive dive
lower in late 2008 when Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy. Nevertheless,
4 Some shares have only a few trading observations per week. This can for example be
due to low supply or legal/regulatory motives.
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Figure 5.1: Market liquidity
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market liquidity makes a quick reversal to an uptrend with speedy recovery to
more normal liquidity conditions in 2009, probably supported by the Federal
Reserve’s monetary programs.
5.2.2 The Federal Reserve’s programs
As our objective is to get a better understanding of the effectiveness of the
unconventional monetary policies, we divide the Federal Reserve’s myriad of
quantitative easing tools into three distinct categories for a simpler analysis.
These categories relate to the Federal Reserve’s H.4.1. documentation of fac-
tors that affect balance sheet information and major policy events as suggested
by Mishkin [2011].
The first category of the credit easing policy tools is the large-scale asset pur-
chasing programs. These policy programs are usually better known as quanti-
tative easing or simply QE. These programs include the Federal Reserve’s long
term treasury purchases, as well as their federal agency debt and mortgage-
backed securities purchases that started in late 2008. Rather than just use
a single heading for all large-scale asset purchases, we try to obtain a more
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detailed view on the impact of these programs by dividing the asset purchases
into three sub-programs, namely QE1, QE2, and QE3.
The initial quantitative easing program (QE1) ran from November 2008 to
the end of August 2010. This first set of quantitative easing instruments con-
sisted of agency debt, agency mortgage-backed security and Treasury security
purchases. The second large-scale asset purchase program was QE2. The sec-
ond quantitative easing program ran from November 2010 to the end of June
2012 and comprised of Treasury security purchases. The final large-scale asset
purchase program was QE3. The third quantitative easing program ran from
September 2012 to the end of October 2014 and consisted of agency mortgage-
backed security and Treasury security purchases.
Also, although it is widely considered a quantitative easing program, please
do note that we have omitted the inclusion of the maturity extension pro-
gram “Operation Twist” from these large-scale asset purchasing programs. We
ended up doing this because the primary purpose of “Operation Twist” was to
only affect the maturity structure of the assets possessed by the Federal Re-
serve without actually increasing the amount of assets owned. Essentially, this
was achieved by selling short-term government bonds and buying an equivalent
value of long-dated Treasuries.
We describe the second category of the credit easing policy tools as lending
to financial institutions (LFI). These programs include repurchase agreements,
term auction credit (TAF), credit to depository institutions, credit extensions,
other Federal Reserve assets, currency swaps, and securities lent to dealers
(including the term securities loan facility, TSLF). Because we are using a
single heading for all these programs, we won’t be specifying durations for
individual programs.
The third and final category of credit easing policy tools is the liquidity to
key credit markets (LCM). These programs include asset-backed commercial
paper money market mutual fund liquidity facility (AMLF), term asset-backed
securities loan facility (TALF), net portfolio holdings of commercial paper
funding facility (CPFF), and Maiden Lane programs. As with the lending for
financial institutions, we are using a single heading for all recorded activities,
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so we wont be specifying durations for any of the individual programs listed
above.
Figure 5.2: Changes in Federal Reserve’s monetary programs
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Figure (5.2) describes the changes in the Federal Reserve’s monetary programs
from February 2007 to November 2014. We can see two spikes in the lending
to financial institutions program in the second half of 2008. The first one is
mainly due to the jump in securities lent to dealers program, and the latter can
be attributed to central bank liquidity swaps. The securities lent to dealers
were fully collateralized loans to primary dealers, and the central bank liquidity
swaps were temporary currency arrangements that the Federal Reserve used
in cooperation with other central banks to provide liquidity in U.S. dollars
to overseas markets. We can also observe notable negative fund flows in the
lending to financial institutions program in early 2009. These negative flows
can be attributed to temporary reciprocal currency arrangements with foreign
central bank entities.
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5.2.3 Control variables
Firstly, we try to control for the possibility of inter-market linkages as proposed
by Cespa and Foucault [2014]. We want to control for the possibility that mar-
ket liquidity is affected by overall market developments in a single influential
benchmark. Essentially, the intuition is that liquidity is affected by contagion
from this single benchmark. This intuition would imply that liquidity would
move according to the observations of Chordia et al. [2001], who argue that
liquidity may be more abundant when there’s a move up in the market, and
equally well, less liquid when there’s a move downwards in the market.
We suggest controlling for this type of market movements with the Standard
& Poor’s 500 index. The S&P 500 is the index that tracks some 500 of the
largest companies listed in the NYSE or NASDAQ. The index is maintained by
S&P Dow Jones Indices and it is one of the most commonly used benchmarks
for the U.S. equity markets. Standard & Poor states that the S&P 500 is a
price return index with float weighting5, based on stocks selected by Standard
& Poor’s committee. In order to be considered selection by Standard & Poor,
the shares need to adhere to a list of criteria6.
First of all, the company’s market capitalization must exceed $5.3 billion.
Secondly, the shares should be listed in either the NYSE or NASDAQ, and
the public float should encompass of a minimum of 50 percent of the stock.
Thirdly, reported earnings must meet a certain level. That is, the sum of the
most recently reported four consecutive quarter’s earnings should be positive,
including the most recently reported quarter. Finally, there are a set of re-
quirements as far as trading with the shares is concerned. Standard & Poor
expects that the ratio of annual dollar value traded to the float adjusted market
capitalization should be 1.00 or greater. But also, in the six months leading up
to the evaluation date, there should be a monthly minimum of 250,000 shares
traded each month.
5 The market capitalization of each company is based on Standard & Poor’s computations
using only the number of shares available for public trading.
6 For more information, please see http://www.spdji.com/.
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With the above requirements in mind, the index level ι is calculated by dividing
the sum of the adjusted market capitalization of all stocks by a proprietary
divisor unique to Standard & Poor. Formally,
ι =
∑
i Pi ∗Qi
Divisor
(5.1)
Moreover, it is possible that market volatility can affect market liquidity. This
hypothesis is based on the work of Kyle and Xiong [2001], who see liquidity
as a concept of risk aversion that creates volatility. We propose controlling
for this type of market volatility with the Chicago Board Options Exchange
Market Volatility Index (VIX).
The VIX index is largely regarded as a key measure of market expectations
of near-term volatility. It measures the market’s expectations of stock market
volatility over the next 30 day period based on S&P 500 stock index option
prices traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The general-
ized formula7 used in the calculation of VIX is
σ2 =
2
T
∑
i
∆
Ki
K2i
eRTQ(Ki)− 1
T
[
F
K0
− 1
]2
(5.2)
where T is the time to expiration, F in the forward index level desired from
index option prices, K0 is the first strike below the forward index level F ,
Ki is the strike price of the ith out-of-the-money option, ∆K is the interval
between strike prices, R is the risk-free interest rate to expiration, and Q is
the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. Essentially, the VIX translates roughly
as the expected annualized change in the S&P 500 index with a 68 percent
probability.
Finally, we control for credit risk in the financial system with the TED spread.
That is, the hypothesis that market liquidity is affected by the level of credit
7 For more information, please see http://www.cboe.com/.
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risk in the financial system [Bernanke, 2009]. The TED spread is the spread be-
tween the 3-month interbank loans (LIBOR) and short-term U.S. government
debt (3-month Treasury bill). Formally, the TED is defined as
TED = (LIBOR− TBILL) (5.3)
The TED rate is often used as a gauge of credit risk, because short-term U.S.
government debt is usually considered risk free, while the 3-month LIBOR is
believed to reflect the credit risk of lending to commercial banks. An increasing
the TED spread thus should be a sign, that interbank lenders are demanding a
higher rate of return because the risk of default has increased. Correspondingly,
a decreasing TED spread would indicate a lower risk of bank default.
Figure 5.3: Control variables
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Figure (5.3) illustrates the evolution of our control variables during the sample
period. We can see that the early phases of the financial crisis were character-
ized by large spikes in both the TED spread and VIX index. During the same
period, the S&P 500 index was in a clear trend downwards. But it quickly
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reversed the trend after 2009, when we also saw a stabilization in the TED
spread. However, the VIX index has since witnessed two major spikes, one in
2010 and another in late 2011. There seems to be some co-movement between
the TED spread and the VIX index. These co-movements are most apparent
during the large spike in 2008, but also during 2010 and late 2011. Further-
more, although the scale of the chart makes it less than ideal for observation,
we can note that these co-movements are also visible between the VIX index
and the S&P 500 index, the two of which seem to share a negative correlation.
This relationship is easiest to observe when elevated levels in the VIX index
are accompanied with moves lower in the S&P 500 index.
5.3 The empirical model
In order to study the impact of unconventional monetary policy on market
liquidity, we estimate the following equation for time t, where ∆ is the change
in the variable. The baseline regression is then
∆γˆt = β1 + β2∆QE1t + β3∆QE2t + β4∆QE3t + β5∆LFIt
+ β6∆LCMt + β7∆spt + β8∆vxt + β9∆tdt + β10∆γˆt−1 + εt
(5.4)
where γˆ is the Pastor and Stambaugh market gamma for the NYSE, NYSE
MKT, and NASDAQ stock exchanges. QE1, QE2, QE3, LFI and LCM are
the reserve bank credit balance of the five Federal Reserve monetary policy
programs (three large-scale asset purchase programs, lending to financial in-
stitutions and liquidity to key credit markets). We control for inter-market
linkages with the S&P 500 index sp, risk aversion and volatility with the VIX
index vx, and credit risk with the TED spread td. Finally, lagged changes are
included for the market gamma.
Furthermore, because the financial media has been packed full of economists
voicing their concern on the tapering effects of quantitative easing, we con-
struct separate models to further analyze the potential asymmetric impact of
these programs. The majority of these concerns focus on a hypothesis that an
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increase in quantitative easing had a positive impact on financial markets, and
that a reduction in the unconventional policy programs might have a significant
impact on financial conditions. We will assess these concerns by decomposing
the program balances into positive and negative changes.
In the first of these separate models, we study whether only positive changes
in the program balances of the unconventional policies had an impact on mar-
ket liquidity. We achieve this by decomposing program balances into posi-
tive changes and evaluating ∆QEx+ = max(0,∆QEx) where x = (1, 2, 3),
∆LFI+ = max(0,∆LFI), and ∆LCM+ = max(0,∆LCM).
Secondly, to assess the question of whether the tapering of these programs
had any impact on market liquidity, we proceed with analyzing only negative
changes in the Federal Reserve’s program balances. Just as before, we decom-
pose the program balances into negative changes and proceed with studying
∆QEx− = min(0,∆QEx) where x = (1, 2, 3), ∆LFI− = min(0,∆LFI), and
∆LCM− = min(0,∆LCM). We examine the results of our baseline regres-
sions and asymmetrical tests in the next section.
Chapter 6
Results
In this part of our study, we assess the impact of the Federal Reserve’s programs
on market liquidity in the NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ stock exchanges
based on a set of empirical results. We will first interpret the results from a
set of baseline regressions, and describe the robustness of our tests in order to
provide a general assessment of the impact of these programs.
Finally, we end this part of our study with the analysis of the asymmetric
effects of the Federal Reserve’s programs. We study the asymmetric impact
with a set of modified regressions that decompose the program balances into
positive and negative changes. We interpret these results in order to provide a
concluding view on the effect of unconventional monetary programs on market
liquidity in equity markets.
6.1 Baseline regressions
We start with very simple specifications to better assess how different com-
binations work in our model. Working this way also helps us to address the
subject of potential multicollinearity, but also helps us see how sensitive our
results are to the specifications we use in our model.
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Models (6.1) to (6.8) show that the empirical effect of the set of control vari-
ables is robust across different specifications of the regressions. Model (6.1) is
the most basic setup with only the large-scale asset purchases QE1 and the
dummy market liquidity measure as variables. Model (6.2) adds the large-scale
asset purchases QE2, and model (6.3) brings in the large-scale asset purchases
QE3 as variables. Model (6.4), and model (6.5) appends the lending to fi-
nancial institutions (LFI), and the liquidity to key credit markets (LCM) to
the regression. Model (6.6), and model (6.7) adds the S&P 500 and VIX in-
dexes as variables. Finally, model (6.8) adds the TED spread to provide a full
set of variables. Model (6.8) with all control variables is used as the baseline
regression in the remainder of the section.
The F-test of overall model statistical significance for models (6.1) to (6.8)
returns p-values smaller than 0.001. These results suggest a 99.9 percent con-
fidence level for statistically significant models. Furthermore, we do not witness
large changes in the estimated regression coefficients, which suggest that mul-
ticollinearity should not be a problem. However, we are somewhat concerned
about some of the signs of the estimated regression coefficients, so we use the
variance inflation factor test methods to further assess the issue of potential
multicollinearity in our model. Variance inflation factors provide a more formal
method for detecting the presence of mulcollinearity. The test results return
VIF values between 1.026 and 3.132. The largest VIF of our model 3.132 sug-
gests that multicollinearity should not be influencing our estimates, as values
only beyond 10 are generally regarded as an indication of multicollinearity.
[Kutner et al., 2004]
We test for autocorrelation by running the Breusch-Pagan test for higher-order
serial correlation on our models [Breusch and Pagan, 1979]. The Breusch- Pa-
gan test statistic on the null hypothesis of no remaining heteroskedasticity
in the residuals strongly suggest autocorrelation in our baseline model. But
equally well, test statics clearly reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity
in also our asymmetric impact models. The autocorrelation function of the esti-
mated error terms of model (6.8) is plotted in figure (6.1). The figure gives clear
indication of autocorrelation in our baseline model. Therefore, it seems appro-
priate to compute heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for the OLS
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estimator and use them when making inferences on the results. Because our
sample size of 404 is large enough to allow it, we calculate Newey-West [Newey
and West, 1987] heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard
errors to correct the biased standard errors. To estimate the number of lags
for the standard errors, we utilize methods suggested by Newey-West [Newey
and West, 1994].
Figure 6.1: Autocorrelation function
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Tables (6.1) and (6.2) present our results from estimating the baseline regres-
sions. Table (6.3) presents the results for the decomposed program balances
of the asymmetric impact models. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent standard errors [Newey and West, 1987] are presented in
parentheses with the results.
The intercept coefficient is positive in our baseline regression. A positive inter-
cept term suggests that if all variables would remain unchanged, the market
liquidity measure is expected to go up. The intuition here is that the market
liquidity measure should improve if there is no turbulence in the market. But
the move is expected to be a relatively minor one.
Large-scale asset purchases QE1, QE2, and QE3 are all negatively associated
with the market liquidity measure. Increases in the LFI are also negatively
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Table 6.1: Changes in amounts outstanding in Federal Reserve programs,
and the market liquidity measure
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
(Intercept) 0.00065 0.00083 0.00134 0.00139
(0.00189) (0.00205) (0.00246) (0.00246)
∆QE1 −0.00027 −0.00027 −0.00028 −0.00029
(0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023)
∆QE2 −0.00009 −0.00011 −0.00010
(0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00019)
∆QE3 −0.00011 −0.00011
(0.00018) (0.00018)
∆LFI −0.00010
(0.00024)
∆γˆt−1 0.49765∗∗∗ 0.49762∗∗∗ 0.49739∗∗∗ 0.49519∗∗∗
(0.06380) (0.06382) (0.06392) (0.06381)
R2 0.26201 0.26204 0.26218 0.26264
Adj. R2 0.25833 0.25650 0.25478 0.25337
Num. obs. 404 404 404 404
RMSE 0.08837 0.08847 0.08858 0.08866
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. The full sample is from February 5,
2007 to October 31, 2014. See table (5.1) for a description of the variables.
correlated with a widening of the liquidity measure, while positive changes
in the LCM are associated with increases in the market liquidity measure.
Increases in both the S&P and VIX indexes tend to coincide with a contraction
in the market liquidity measure. Lastly, increases in the TED spread tend to
be positively correlated with a widening of the liquidity measure.
While the negative coefficient of the VIX index is intuitively correct in corre-
lating an increased market volatility with illiquidity, the negative association
between the market liquidity measure and the Federal Reserve’s large-scale
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Table 6.2: Changes in amounts outstanding in Federal Reserve programs,
and the market liquidity measure
6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8
(Intercept) 0.00246 0.00240 0.00262 0.00263
(0.00300) (0.00299) (0.00304) (0.00308)
∆QE1 −0.00040 −0.00040 −0.00038 −0.00036
(0.00029) (0.00029) (0.00029) (0.00030)
∆QE2 −0.00006 −0.00007 −0.00003 −0.00003
(0.00020) (0.00020) (0.00019) (0.00019)
∆QE3 −0.00014 −0.00015 −0.00013 −0.00013
(0.00019) (0.00019) (0.00019) (0.00018)
∆LFI −0.00011 −0.00008 −0.00007 −0.00014
(0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00023) (0.00022)
∆LCM 0.00351 0.00346 0.00367 0.00375
(0.00470) (0.00466) (0.00472) (0.00477)
∆sp 0.00010 −0.00017 −0.00022
(0.00022) (0.00026) (0.00027)
∆vx −0.00290 −0.00414∗∗
(0.00363) (0.00421)
∆td 0.09069∗∗∗
(0.05060)
∆γˆt−1 0.48875∗∗∗ 0.48876∗∗∗ 0.47989∗∗∗ 0.45922∗∗∗
(0.06380) (0.06447) (0.06470) (0.05938)
R2 0.26471 0.26571 0.26940 0.28453
Adj. R2 0.25360 0.25273 0.25460 0.26819
Num. obs. 404 404 404 404
RMSE 0.08865 0.08870 0.08859 0.08778
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. The full sample is from February 5,
2007 to October 31, 2014. See table (5.1) for a description of the variables.
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Table 6.3: Changes in amounts outstanding in Federal Reserve programs,
and the market liquidity measure
6.8+ 6.8−
(Intercept) 0.00313 0.00144
(0.00336) (0.00265)
∆QE1+ −0.00058∗
(0.00041)
∆QE2+ −0.00014
(0.00019)
∆QE3+ −0.00014
(0.00018)
∆LFI+ −0.00043
(0.00029)
∆LCM+ 0.01199∗∗
(0.00973)
∆QE1− −0.00149
(0.00147)
∆QE2− N/A
N/A
∆QE3− 0.00029
(0.00120)
∆LFI− 0.00042
(0.00032)
∆LCM− −0.00115
(0.00376)
R2 0.29473 0.28266
Adj. R2 0.27862 0.26813
Num. obs. 404 404
RMSE 0.08715 0.08778
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.
The full sample is from February 5, 2007 to October 31,
2014. See table (5.1) for a description of the variables.
∆QE2− is not available due to lack of observations.
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asset purchase and LCM programs, and the S&P 500 index, as well as the
positive relation between the market liquidity measure and the TED spread
need a closer look. The negative coefficients of the Federal Reserve’s opera-
tions such as the large-scale asset purchases (QE1, QE2, and QE3), LFI, and
S&P 500 index might initially seem unanticipated. But one possible explana-
tion for the negative coefficient in these programs could be in the “flight to
liquidity” effect that we discussed earlier, and the portfolio rebalancing effects
reported by Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub [2013]. Also, it should be noted
that these findings are generally consistent with studies assessing the impact
of unconventional policies to equity markets [see for example Bayoumi and
Bui, 2011, Fratzscher et al., 2013]. Finally, the positive coefficient in the TED
spread could suggest that an increasing TED spread does not directly translate
into illiquidity in the asset markets. We can easily make the assumption that
there exists a certain lag as to when a tightening in the credit conditions starts
affecting the operating environment of financial intermediaries.
The results are all statistically insignificant with the exception of the vx and td
variables. The VIX index is statistically significant at the 5 percent significance
level, and the TED spread is significant at the 1 percent significance level.
The coefficient for the lagged changes in the market liquidity measure ∆γˆt−1 is
positive and statistically highly significant at the 1 percent significance level.
Our study thus seems to suggest that neither large-scale asset purchases, nor
the LFI and LCM programs had a statistically meaningful stabilizing effect on
the liquidity of asset markets as measured from stock exchange data. How-
ever, our study does not take into account the announcement effects of such
programs, so while we do not witness a direct relationship between the effec-
tive large-scale asset purchases and market liquidity, we cannot fully rule out
the possibility of correlation via other means1. Also, while we try to main-
tain a sound and sensible approach in our research, some of the assumptions,
requirements, and values we impose in our calculations are clearly subject to
1 For example, Bayoumi and Bui [2011] argue that better post-crisis financial conditions
in equity markets are universally attributed to increases in Treasury yields, and Lo
Duca and Straub [2013] suggest that the announcement effect is the primary channel
of impact.
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debate. This is most evident in our choice of parameters in calculating the
market liquidity measure. But also relevant as far as the grouping of uncon-
ventional monetary programs are concerned. Modifying any of these specifica-
tions and/or testing the impact of monetary programs individually could have
a distinguishable effect on the results of our tests. Finally, the apparent lack
of statistical significance in the coefficients of large-scale asset purchases could
simply be attributed to the averaging out of the effects due to increases and
decreases in the balance of programs, or just due to averaging out over time.
To address the issue of a potential averaging out over time, we ran a few test
regressions limiting the observations to the highly volatile crisis period between
the years 2008 and 2010. However, although some changes were visible (most
notably, the multiple R-squared figure rose to 0.3441, and the adjusted R-
squared value increased to 0.2968), the overall conclusions remained the same.
That is, there was no clearly observable statistically significant effect on market
liquidity from the unconventional policies. We will address the concerns of
increases and decreases in the balance of programs averaging out in the next
section, where we assess the results of asymmetric impact.
6.2 Asymmetric impact
In this section we will report the results from our asymmetric tests. In the
following regressions we have decomposed the program balances into positive
and negative changes in order to assess the impact of the policy programs on
market liquidity in even greater detail.
First we report the results of model (6.8+), which is otherwise identical to
model (6.8), but now accounts for the positive changes in the Federal Re-
serve’s program balances. Correspondingly, we then proceed to assessing the
relationship between the negative changes in the Federal Reserve’s program
balances and market liquidity from the results of model (6.8−). Please note
however, that the variable of the QE2 large-scale asset purchase program is
not available for the assessment of negative changes in our sample period due
to the lack of observations.
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Results from model (6.8+) suggest that positive changes in the QE1, QE2, and
QE3 large-scale asset purchase programs are negatively associated with the
market liquidity measure. These results are consistent with previous findings
as reported earlier. Equally well, increases in the LFI are also associated with a
negative relationship with market liquidity, and the LCM witnesses a positive
association with the market liquidity measure, both of which are in line with
our earlier results. Furthermore, we find that all results remain statistically
insignificant as a predictor of the market liquidity measure with the exception
of the QE1 large-scale asset purchase program and the liquidity to key credit
markets program. The results for the positive changes in the QE1 program are
statistically significant at the 0.10 level, while the LCM program is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level.
On the other hand, results from model (6.8−) indicate that negative changes
in the QE1 large-scale asset purchase program are negatively associated with
market liquidity, while QE3 shows a positive association. These results suggest
that the while tapering in the QE1 large-scale asset purchase program had a
negative impact on the market liquidity measure, this effect was no longer
observable in the QE3 large-scale asset purchase program. The existence of
a binding relationship on the downside between the market liquidity measure
and the QE1 program could be a reflection of the exceptionally fragile market
conditions between November 2008 and August 2010. Similarly, the negative
changes in the LFI program are also positively associated with market liquidity.
But the negative changes in the LCM program are negatively associated with
market liquidity. However, we find that the QE1 and QE3 large-scale asset
purchase programs, as well as the LFI and LCM programs were all statistically
not significant predictors of market liquidity.
Overall, our results are roughly in line with the findings of Bayoumi and Bui
[2011] and Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub [2013] on the impact of unconven-
tional monetary policies on equity markets. Although our baseline regressions
show no clear evidence of an impact on market liquidity, our asymmetric tests
suggest that the impact of unconventional monetary policy was statistically
significant with the QE1 large-scale asset purchases and liquidity to key credit
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markets programs. Positive changes in the QE1 program are negatively associ-
ated with the market liquidity measure, while positive changes in the liquidity
to key credit markets are associated with an increase in the market liquidity
measure. Judging from these results, the LCM program seems to have been
the most efficient stabilizing policy in terms of direct effect on market liquidity.
While our results indicate a statistically significant relationship between the
positive changes in the QE1 and LCM programs and market liquidity mea-
sure, our results are not particularly encouraging in terms of finding statistical
evidence supporting the relationship between market liquidity and the other
market operations by the Federal Reserve. More specifically, we were not able
to confirm the positive tone associated to economic literature studying the lend-
ing to financial institutions programs such as TAF [see for example McAndrews
et al., 2008, Christensen et al., 2009, Wu, 2008, Sarkar and Shrader, 2010]. But
this can potentially be due to other programs such as the TSLF averaging out
the statistical significance of programs such as TAF. Nevertheless, these results
can also be attributed to methodology and the parameters in the measure of
market liquidity adopted in our study, or other specifications in our model,
rather than to a more fundamental difference in interpretation.
However, the results are still potentially positive news. Because perhaps more
importantly, our study suggests that the tapering of large-scale asset purchases
or the reductions in the LFI and LCM programs have not been a particularly
negative shock to market liquidity and risk to the systemic stability of the
financial system.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and comments
The objective of this study was to assess whether the Federal Reserve’s uncon-
ventional monetary policy has had a statistically observable impact on market
liquidity. We have described the background of the financial crisis, and have
elaborated on the trends leading to the crisis and systemic bank runs. We have
accounted for the fundamental concept of liquidity in economic literature, and
have provided a summary of the models of financial contagion relating to liq-
uidity. In this study, we also have explained central bank balance sheet policies
during the crisis, and provided empirical evidence on the impact of unconven-
tional monetary policies on market liquidity.
Our study used a liquidity proxy based on Pastor and Stambaugh’s [2003]
specifications complemented with data from the CRSP database and the Fed-
eral Reserve economic data program. We have used this setup to evaluate the
impact of the Federal Reserve’s monetary programs on market liquidity in the
NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ stock exchanges.
Our empirical tests included baseline regressions and asymmetric impact tests,
where the program balances were decomposed into positive and negative changes.
In general, from baseline regressions we were able to conclude that the large-
scale asset purchase programs (QE1, QE2, and QE3), lending to financial insti-
tutions, and liquidity to key credit markets programs didn’t have a statistically
significant impact on market liquidity.
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In asymmetric tests, our results suggested that only the positive changes in the
QE1 large-scale asset purchase program and the liquidity to key credit markets
program had a statistically significant impact on market liquidity. Positive
changes in the QE1 program were associated with contractions in the market
liquidity measure, while positive changes in the liquidity to key credit markets
tended to coincide with an increase in the market liquidity measure. These
results suggest that the LCM program was the most efficient stabilizing policy if
measured by direct impact on market liquidity. Conversely, our results did not
support the notion that the tapering in either the large-scale asset purchases,
lending to financial institutions, or liquidity to key credit markets programs
had any statistically significant impact on the market liquidity measure.
In conclusion, these results are roughly in line with earlier studies assessing
the impact of the Federal Reserve’s monetary programs on equity markets [see
for example Bayoumi and Bui, 2011, Fratzscher et al., 2013]. We are confident
on the asymmetric impact of the positive changes in the QE1 large-scale asset
purchase program and the liquidity to key credit markets programs on market
liquidity, but are less convinced with the effects of other programs. Essentially,
we are not able to replicate the positive tone of results in studies assessing the
impact of lending to financial institutions to the context of equity markets [see
for example McAndrews et al., 2008, Christensen et al., 2009, Wu, 2008, Sarkar
and Shrader, 2010]. Still, these minor differences might be attributed to the
specifications of our model and concept of liquidity, and thus might change if
parameters or assumptions were to be modified and retested.
Our results raise some questions about the exact channel of impact of un-
conventional monetary policies and the specifications for our liquidity proxy.
While the direct effects from market operations to market liquidity could be
negative, Bayoumi and Bui [2011] suggest that the indirect impact via for ex-
ample Treasury yields can be notable. This begs the question on how would
it then be possible to make a more sound assessment of liquidity from the
available data. Also, there are a few more important caveats that relate to
the data that is available. For example, it is not obvious that the Federal
Reserve’s monetary operations are purely exogenous. Fratzscher, Lo Duca and
Straub [2013] note that the decisions by the Federal Reserve might of been to
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a certain extent endogenous to market developments, suggesting that tighter
market conditions during certain weeks could have influenced the Federal Re-
serve to provide more liquidity. While our study has focused on the effective
weekly market operations of the Federal Reserve, our paper does not take into
account the announcement effect of such policies. Studies by Fratzscher, Lo
Duca and Straub [2013], Ait-Sahalia, Adnritzky, Jobst, Nowak, and Tamirisa
[2012] emphasize that the announcement effect is one of the most efficient pol-
icy tools of the Federal Reserve. Although asset prices tend to react instantly
to policy announcements, it is not evident how quickly these announcements
are discounted in portfolio flows and how they might impact on market con-
ditions. Also, another question is how well do financial markets foresee and
anticipate the announcements and operations by the Federal Reserve. If the
policy moves have been correctly anticipated by markets, it would be expected
that portfolios have been already adjusted to reflect these conditions.
While it is not always evident how we should address these concerns, one po-
tential solution would be in extending our study using event studies or different
liquidity proxies based on more detailed microstructure transaction data such
as TAQ data complemented with a more specified decomposition of the Federal
Reserve’s monetary programs (perhaps on daily data). Alternatively, one could
shift the focus to assessing the aggregate macrostructure of liquidity shocks in
financial markets. One particularly interesting perspective could be in study-
ing the exact conditions that push brokerages/dealers to increase or decrease
margins and/or haircuts, and whether aggregate cash inflows/outflows into eq-
uity funds or increased macroprudential regulation serve as any indicator of
such activities. Any of such modifications to our study could further highlight
interesting contributing factors as far as market liquidity is concerned.
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